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Abstract
In this paper we challenge Parente and Prescott’s (1999) theoretical framework, which estab-
lishes that unions use their control of “work practices” to thwart the efficient use of technology
in the firms. We argue instead that unions, despite endowing monopoly rights over a technology,
should tend to impose its efficient use. In fact if union members care about labor disutility, along
with wage incomes, they will dictate ”work practices” consistent with operating technology at full
efficiency, in order to allow workers to enjoy more leisure. Our result is more general than Parente
and Prescott’s and does not rely on the particular specification of preferences.
KEYWORDS: Trade Unions, Inefficiency, Technological Change, Institutions and Growth
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1. Introduction
One of the most controversial issues in economic development and industrial re-
lations is the possible hostility of the coalitions of factor owners to the adoption
of leading-edge technologies. In an influential paper, Parente and Prescott (1999)
(PP from now) introduced an innovative model that still represents the state of
the art in this literature, and is characterized by two important results:
1. Labor unions use their control of the current ”work practices” to obstruct
the eﬃcient use of the technology in the firms.
2. Labor unions use their size and their eﬃcacy in collective action to commit
workers to a particular sector, in order to impede the introduction of new and
more productive technologies.
Here we argue against PP’s first conclusion analyzing cases in which workers
in fact do care about leisure. The economic intuition for our result relies on the
very notion of labor productivity: any eﬃciency gain allows workers to get at
least the same income in a shorter working time. Although it is diﬃcult to find
data supporting our claim, it is possible to examine historical examples of unions
demanding the reduction of working hours, such as trade unions’ struggle for the
eight-hour workday in the US and in several European countries over the last two
centuries. A more recent example is the demand for higher wages and shorter
work hours (11 to 8 hours) by Mexican immigrants working at green groceries in
New York City (New York Times, February 15, 2001). In another recent case,
the dockworker’s union ”West Coast Longshoremen” seems to have reaped rents
in the form of both higher hourly wages and higher leisure oﬀ the job.
Our result does not rely on particular functional specifications of the disutility
of labor; nor does it rest on specific ranges of parameter values. Instead we derive
our results from basic economics.
We will prove our main result in Section 2. In Section 3 we conclude.
2. Does the Inclusion of Leisure Imply an Eﬃcient Use of
Technology?
A general description of PP’s (1999) model is the following: Each industrial good
can be produced by using three constant returns to scale technologies, 0, 1, and 2,
which require only labor as an input and which are characterized by their average
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and marginal productivity π0 < π1 < π2.1
Industry i’s trade union is assumed to have monopoly rights on the use of
technology 1: if a firm wants to use it, only union members can be hired to operate
it. Therefore the union will dictate both their wage, wx, and their (common)
eﬃciency level πx ≤ π1. Hence the union is able to control the ”work practices”
associated with the use of technology 1. This is their definition of ”monopoly
rights”. Notice that there is a union in every industry and that there are an infinite
number of coalitions, each holding this kind of power over the corresponding
technology.2
There is free entry of price competing firms into each industry. Each firm that
is not willing to accept the union’s terms of use for technology 1 can freely use
the less productive technology 0 and hire as many workers as it wishes out of the
named ”agricultural” sector by paying them wa.
3
In order to derive their second result (the ”non-adoption” result), PP focus
on the alternative to these two technologies, which is technology 2. Technology
2 is the most productive, but its use is not free, because firms are assumed to
be forced to pay a fixed initial cost (an ”entry fee”) that is proportional to the
number of workers in the economy. This is the assumption of ”resistance to
technological adoption” by the whole labor force, and not only by industry i.
Moreover, coalition members are committed to work in the coalition’s industry for
the current period, while nonmembers are perfectly mobile across industries. The
”entry fee” is responsible for the non-adoption of technology 2 in the equilibrium
of the game, which exists for a specific set of parameters.4
Again according to PP’s model, preferences are assumed, such that the demand
function D(p) for the industry’s product is always (imperfectly) inelastic; that is,
the total industry revenue pD(p) is always increasing in p > 0. It obviously follows
that the union, in order to maximize its members’ average wage, wx, will dictate
1For the purpose of this study we will focus on the instantaneous partial equilibrium for the
single generic industry i ∈ [0, 1].
2We are talking about ”technology 0, 1, and 2”, because we are focusing on a single industy
i, but the reader should keep in mind that in this model there is a continuum of industries, and
hence an uncountable number of such technologies, each owned by an uncountable number of
zero measure coalitions holding the corresponding ”monopoly rights”.
3Of course it will never do so along the equilibrium path.
4Literally speaking, the ”monopoly rights” only regard the right of the union to control
the use of technology 1, while the additional ”resistance” and ”commitment” assumptions are
theoretically diﬀerent ingredients, needed to derive the non-adoption result.
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”work practices” so that the price of the product is the highest. The highest price
is not to exceed the average and marginal cost of the potential competitors, such
that this price will equal wa/π0 while the amount demanded will equalD (wa/π0).5
What ”work practices” should the union impose on firms willing to use tech-
nology 1? Theoretically, the union can implement two possible maximization
strategies:
1. The union can set the duration (or the intensity) of the working day to a
fraction t < 1 and then use technology 1 at its full potential so that the relation:
π1Nxt = D (wa/π0) holds.
2. The union can set the productivity of each worker who operates technology
1 at an ineﬃcient level π1(x) < π1 so that the relation:
π1(x)Nx = D (wa/π0) holds.6
In our analysis of the labor market we assume that individuals enjoy leisure.
Hence we conclude:
Proposition 2.1. If the utility of the workers increases with leisure, then tech-
nology 1 will always be operated eﬃciently.
Proof. The total wage income per union member, wx, is the same under both
alternatives, wx =
D(wa/π0)wa/π0
Nx
. On the other hand, the value of leisure is non-
negative under alternative 1 and zero under alternative 2.7 Hence, if the utility of
the workers increases with leisure, union members are better oﬀ under alternative
1 than under alternative 2. Therefore, a rational union will dictate eﬃcient use
of technology 1, but a working day lower than or equal to 1.
Remark. It is important to note that the result of Proposition 1 is general: it
does not depend on any particular specification of the disutility of labor. So long
as workers care about leisure it will always hold.
The following Corollary makes plain the relation between the previous Propo-
sition and PP’s result:
Corollary 2.2. Only if workers do not care at all about leisure is the union
indiﬀerent between operating technology 1 eﬃciently and operating it ineﬃciently.
Proof. From the previous analysis.
5The new entrants can always freely use technology 0 associated with the lower productivity.
6For both strategies, Nx (the union size) is assumed large enough to produce the total
quantity demanded, π1Nx ≥ D (wa/π0).
7If π1Nxt = D (wa/π0) and π1Nx = D (wa/π0) then 1 = t.
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3. Final Remarks
In this paper we have proved, in a rather more general framework than PP’s, that
worker unions holding monopoly rights over a technology will tend to use their
power to impose the eﬃcient use of the technology. Therefore, our claim seems to
undermine PP’s result that unions resist the eﬃcient use of technology. If workers
value leisure, they will prefer reducing working time through the use of technology
to its full potential.
Of course, leisure is a ”barrier to riches”. The GDP per worker would decrease
both according to our model (where monopoly rights restrict output by increasing
leisure) and according to PP’s model (where unions prevent the use of technology
at full potential). Of course, also, ”riches” and ”welfare” are not the same. The
welfare losses generated by lower output would be compensated, in part, by the
gain in leisure.
It is important to remark that our result critically hinges on the assumption
that the workweek belongs to the ”work practices” under the domain controlled by
the trade unions. Though this assumption could be appropriate in some cases (as
indicated in the Introduction) it could seem a bit extreme in other cases. Clearly,
it is diﬃcult to prove with concrete data who has the ”power” to regulate hours.
However, if one thinks that unions do not have influence over work hours, one
ought to propose an explanation as to why that might be, since the underlying
reason for it may well influence the analysis of how unions deal with technological
change.8 A theory of this sort would also need to explain why the public would
be willing to accept ineﬃcient technology use but not lower work hours. It is
an entirely open question, and an interesting one for further research, why this
would be the case Why do labor unions not seem to reap their rents in the form
of leisure oﬀ the job? Perhaps in a more general framework, the answer could
be that a government will only grant and protect monopoly rights of a group if
there is suﬃcient public support for this policy. But if the public were to learn
that union members work fewer hours than average, the union would risk losing
its protection. Thus, even if the monopoly rights were to include the right to set
the workweek length, a labor union might not want to exercise this right.
Reinterpreting and extending our result in light of such institutional and
political-economy considerations may help illuminate the findings in Schmitz (2003).
He discusses the question why workers seem to capture rents both by resisting eﬃ-
8According to Pencavel (1991, p.45-49), labor unions have pursued reductions in workweek
length primarily in declining industries.
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cient work rules and by taking more on-the-job leisure, rather than by taking more
oﬀ-the-job leisure. Schmitz argues that there are political constraints on receiv-
ing very high hourly wages. The industry could be subsidized less and/or taxed
more, and the unions could receive less political and popular support. Schmitz
describes how various work rules (e.g., narrow job classification) serve to enforce
under-utilization of workers (i.e., promote leisure on the job).
The introduction of a more realistic assumption for the labor market highlights
the need to go beyond PP to explain why workers do thwart technology adoption
rather than enjoy more leisure. We believe that this is an important task for
future research.
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